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Abstract
We experimentally study bidder collusion in open ascending auctions for multiple
objects. The project is based on the theoretical results by Brusco and Lopomo (1999),
who give theoretical support for the following claims: (1) simultaneous ascending bid
auctions can be vulnerable to collusion in the multi-object case; (2) The sole pres-
ence of complementarities does not hinder collusion; (3) Collusion is a “lownumbers”
phenomenon. We focus on a simultaneous ascending auction for two objects. Several
experimental treatments are considered: markets with low numbers (2 bidders) and
high numbers (5 bidders), no complementarities (additive values) and complemen-
tarities (superadditive values). Experimental results are largely consistent with the
theory. Collusion is often observed in two-person markets with or without comple-
mentarities. Previous experience under the same treatment greatly facilitates bidder
collusion. There is no evidence of collusion in ﬁve-person markets. We further study
collusive strategies adopted by bidders in two-person markets. While most strategies
make extensive use of signaling, in the presence of complementarities, bidders use
collusive strategies that are supported only by repeated play.
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11 Introduction
This study presents an experimental examination of bidder collusion in open ascending
auctions for multiple objects. Auctions are an increasingly popular institution on the
Internet for consumer to consumer (ebay and Amazon), business to consumer (OnSale),
and business to business (FreeMarkets) transactions. Auctions are also nowbeing utilized
for government procurement and privatization programs in many countries. The value of
the objects being auctioned oﬀ has made the possibility of collusion even more daunting;
the potential loses in revenue and eﬃciency are tremendous.
In many of these auctions, multiple heterogeneous items are for sale simultaneously.
In auctions of these sort, such as auctions for timber, automobiles, or bandwidth, there
has been the suggestion that bidders can proﬁt by splitting the markets. This allows each
bidder to act as “local” monopsonist for a particular object driving the price they must
pay down. However, assuming that communication between the bidders is limited to the
bidding, any such splitting of the markets must be coordinated by signaling in the early
stages of the auction.
The Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions brought to the forefront
the possibility of collusion of this sort (Milgrom, 1998; Cramton and Schwartz, 2000). The
recent FCC spectrum auctions employed a simultaneous multi-object ascending auction
format. Cramton and Schwartz (2000) report that ﬁrms bidding for similar licenses used
signaling and bidding at lowprices to tacitly coordinate on license allocations across
markets; the deviations from tacit agreements were punished with retaliating bids. There
is evidence that bidders sometimes used the ﬁnancially inconsequential portion of the bid
(the last three digits) in order to signal their identity or to indicate a market that bidder
will retaliate against in the event the current bid is raised. In fact, in 1997, the FCC ﬁned
Mercury PCS $650,000 for “placing trailing numbers at the end of its bids that disclosed its
bidding strategy in a ...manner that speciﬁcally invited collusive behavior” (FCC 1997).
Collusion in auction markets has been studied by both economic theorists (Milgrom,
1987; Graham and Marshall, 1987; McAfee and McMillan, 1992; Brusco and Lopomo,
1999) and experimentalists (Isaac, Ramey and Williams, 1984; Isaac and Walker, 1985;
Kwasnica, 2000; Sherstyuk, 1999). Experimental studies indicate that collusion can be
quite eﬀective in posted-oﬀer and sealed bid markets, provided that the sellers (buyers)
are allowed to communicate between periods (Isaac, Ramey and Williams, 1984; Isaac
and Walker, 1985; Kwasnica, 2000). The growing empirical literature presents evidence of
bidder collusion in both sealed bid auctions, such as auctions for state highway construction
contracts and school milk markets (Feinstein, Block and Nold, 1985; Porter and Zona, 1993
and 1999) and oral ascending bid auctions, such as forest service timber sales (Baldwin,
2Marshall and Richards, 1997).
Brusco and Lopomo (1999) (BL) provide a theoretical foundation for the existence of
collusion via signaling in multiple object auctions. They demonstrate that there exists a
perfect Bayes Nash equilibrium where the bidders capture a larger portion of the surplus
than under the “competitive” bidding equilibrium. In the collusive equilibrium, bidders
use the multi-object simultaneous ascending nature of the auction to signal preferences
over objects and allocate the objects among bidders at lowbids; the equilibrium is enforced
by the threat of reverting to competitive bidding if deviation occurs. Such equilibria exist
in situations where bidders valuations for two objects are either independent or there exists
a large complementarity for the purchase of both objects. BL also showthat collusion is a
lownumbers phenomenon; the collusive outcome of the auctions diﬀers less from the com-
petitive outcome as the number of bidders increase. However, the equilibrium suggested
by BL is extremely complex and requires common beliefs about contingent punishments
making it unlikely that bidders would be able to implement these strategies in reality; this
is especially true when compared to the relative simplicity of the competitive equilibrium.
There may also exist many other collusive equilibria displaying similar features. Unfortu-
nately, it is diﬃcult to study this phenomenon empirically due to the lack of observability
of bidders’ valuations; empirical tests have a diﬃcult time distinguishing between collusive
behavior and lowvaluations. Therefore, a natural avenue for investigation appears to be
the experimental laboratory. Recent experimental evidence suggests that collusion in mul-
tiple object auctions might be successful. Kwasnica (2000) found that bidders were able
to collude in all 10 experiments of a multi-object sealed bid auction. These bidders used
quite sophisticated strategies in order to determine the winning bidders. In his setting,
the only Bayes Nash equilibrium is the competitive equilibrium (Maskin and Riley, 1996);
therefore, cooperative equilibria are obtained by allowing for preplay communication. The
equilibria suggested by BL are non-cooperative in nature; it might be reasonable to expect
that they could be achieved without communication. Sherstyuk (1999) provides some in-
sight into the possibility of collusion in ascending price auctions without communication.
When a single market ascending auction is amended to allowbidders to place tie bids, col-
lusive Nash equilibria can be supported through the use of trigger strategies. She reports
that collusion is often observed in both common and private value experimental ascending
auctions of this sort. The collusive outcomes described by BL add a degree of complexity
for the bidders by requiring signaling in addition to trigger strategies.
In this study, we explore the possibility of collusion in multi-object ascending price
auctions without communication. We use laboratory experiments to examine the following
questions.
31. Do bidders collude in ascending multi-object auctions?
2. If so, what sort of collusive strategies are used? Are they consistent with the theo-
retical predictions of BL?
3. Howdoes the inclusion of complementarities aﬀect the success of collusion?
The main purpose of this paper is to discover whether the economic intuitions provided
by BL can be supported in the experimental laboratory. Our results qualitatively support
the BL predictions. Bidders can collude in auctions for multiple objects both with and
without complementarities. As predicted, collusion is only observed in small groups (size
of 2). On the other hand, we show that collusive strategies often diﬀer markedly from those
suggested by BL. In addition, previous experience with the auction institution appears to
be salient in enabling collusion between bidders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we state the theoretical
predictions on collusion and illustrate them using simple examples. Section 3 describes
the experimental design. Results are presented in section 4. In section 5 we examine
individual behavior. We conclude and discuss issues for future consideration is section 6
2 Theoretical predictions
The theoretical framework, as given by BL, is the following. Let there be two objects, A
and B, and the set N of bidders, i =1 ,..,n. The institution is the simultaneous ascending
bid auction, in which each object is auctioned oﬀ in a separate market via an ascending
bid auction run simultaneously for both objects. Let ai be bidder i’s value for object A,
and bi be bidder i’s value for object B. Bidder i’s value for the package AB is given by
ui(AB)=ai + bi + ki,
where ki is the additive complementarity term. It is assumed that values (ai,b i,k i) are
drawn independently across bidders from the same probability distribution with support
[0,100]2×K, where K is either {0} (no complementarity) or an interval [k,¯ k] with k > 100
(large complementarity). Finally, ai and bi have identical marginal distributions, denoted
by f and F respectively. Under these conditions, BL showthe follow ing:
1. With no complementarity, the Separate English Auction strategy proﬁle (SEA: bid
up to your value on each object independently of the other object) forms a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in the simultaneous ascending bid auction. The result-
ing allocation is eﬃcient and the prices are equal to the second highest values for
each object. We will refer to the corresponding outcome as the SEA competitive
outcome.
42. With large complementarities, k > 100, there exists a (competitive) PBE with the
following outcome: the two objects are allocated to the bidder with the highest value
for the package, at a price equal to the second highest valuation for the package; the
allocation is always eﬃcient. We will refer to the corresponding price as the Vickrey
price for the package, and the corresponding outcome – the Vickrey competitive
outcome.
3. If there are two bidders, n = 2, then under certain restrictions on the distribution of
values F and the distribution over K, collusive outcomes (each bidder buys only one
object at a price belowthe CE price) can be supported as PBE in the simultaneous
ascending bid auction. These equilibria are sustained using the threat to revert
to competitive play if players deviate from their collusive strategies. The above
mentioned restrictions hold, in particular, if F is uniform, and if K is degenerate
on some value k, with k =0 ,o rk>100, i.e., the complementarity is common and
known across bidders. We will refer to the corresponding outcomes as BL collusive
outcomes.
4. Collusion is a lownumbers phenomenon. If n>2 and k = 0 (no complementarity),
the prices under the collusive BL outcome diﬀers less from the competitive outcome.
BL collusive strategies prescribe bidding competitively until only two bidders are
left bidding; then strategies similar to the n = 2 case are employed. With a positive
complementarity and n>2, collusive equilibria are not characterized.
Example 1 Let there be n = 2 bidders, with a1 = 96, b1 = 72, a2 =6 ,b2 = 54. If k =0
(no complementarity), then the SEA competitive outcome is pa =6 ,pb = 54, with both
items allocated to bidder 1. The BL collusive strategy prescribes each bidder to signal
their most preferred item by bidding on it ﬁrst. They stop bidding if no one else bids on
this item. Hence, the BL collusive strategy in this case yields the following outcome: item
A is allocated to bidder 1 at pa = 1, and item B is allocated to bidder 2 at pb =1 . 1 Note
that the resulting allocation is ineﬃcient.
If k = 101 (large complementarity), then the Vickrey competitive outcome is pa+pb =
6 + 54 + 101 = 161, with both items allocated to bidder 1. The BL collusive outcome
coincides with the one described above (for k = 0) in this case.
Example 2 Let there be n = 2 bidders, with a1 = 38, b1 =8 ,a2 = 36, b2 = 29. If
k = 0 (no complementarity), then the SEA competitive outcome is pa = 36, with item A
allocated to bidder 1, and pb = 8, with item B allocated to bidder 2. The BL collusive
1We assume that a bid of 1 is the minimum allowable bid as well as the minimum bid increment for
future bids.
5strategy prescribes each bidder to ﬁrst bid on their most preferred item, and, if both
bidders bid on the same item, keep bidding on it until one of the bidders switches to the
other item; then stop. In this case, both bidders will start bidding on item A, until its
price reaches 8, at which point bidder 2 will switch to item B. The rational for bidder 2’s
switch is that he would prefer to win B at a price of 1 and a potential proﬁt of 28 than
to raise the bidding on A to 9 for a maximum potential proﬁt of 27. Once the markets
have been split, the bidders discontinue bidding. Hence, the BL collusive strategy yields
the following outcome: item A is allocated to bidder 1 at pa = 8, and item B is allocated
to bidder 2 at pb =1 .
If k = 101 (large complementarity), then the Vickrey competitive outcome is pa+pb =
3 8+8+1 0 1=147, with both items allocated to bidder 2. If colluding bidders anticipate
that the common complementarity term will be competed away under the Vickrey com-
petitive outcome, then the BL collusive strategy and the corresponding outcome are the
same as in the no complementarity case:2 item A is allocated to bidder 1 at pa = 8, and
item B is allocated to bidder 2 at pb =1 .
It is useful to add a number of additional observations to the above predictions. First, it
is easy to note that competitive PBE outcomes characterized by BL (items 1 and 2 above)
have a close correspondence to competitive equilibria (CE) in the neoclassical sense.3
Second, BL do not consider the case of a moderate complementarity, where 0 <k i < 100.
In general, both the “competitive” and collusive equilibria are hard to characterize in this
case. We note, however, that in the special case of common complementarity, K = {k},
and n = 2 bidders, for any k>0, there exists a competitive equilibrium price and
allocation pair, with the resulting allocation being eﬃcient. Speciﬁcally, let us call a CE
price p a minimal CE price if for any other CE price ˜ p, pa + pb ≤ ˜ pa +˜ pb. Then we can
state the following (see Sherstyuk, 2000, for proofs and details):
Observation 1 Suppose there are two bidders, n =2 , and the complementarity term
is common, k ≥ 0. Then for any k ≥ 0, the set of competitive equilibrium prices and
allocations is non-empty, and any CE allocation is eﬃcient. The minimal CE prices have
the following characteristic:
2In this paper we focus on the “high collusion” equilibria of BL,which maximize bidders’ expected
surplus among all possible collusive equilibria
3A price p =( pa,p b) is a competitive equilibrium price if,given p,there is an allocation of objects to
bidders µ : {A,B}→N such that each bidder gets a package in their demand set,i.e.,there is no excess
demand. Such price and allocation pair (p,µ) is called a competitive equilibrium. Given that bidders’
values for objects are non-negative, ai,b i ≥ 0,the equilibrium also requires no excess supply,i.e.,both
objects are allocated to bidders.
6• Suppose that allocating both items to one bidder, or packaging, is eﬃcient:
ai + bi + k ≥ max{ai + bj,a j + bi,a j + bj + k},
for some i,j ∈ N, i  = j. Then the minimal CE prices correspond to the Vickrey
price for the package. That is, they satisfy the following constraint:
pa + pb = aj + bj + k. (1)
• Suppose that splitting of items between the bidders is eﬃcient:
ai + bj ≥ max{aj + bi,a i + bi + k,aj + bj + k},
for some i,j ∈ N, i  = j. Then the minimal CE prices satisfy the following constraint:
pa + pb = aj + bi +2 k. (2)
Further, for the case of large complementarities, the strategies described by BL to support
the Vickrey equilibrium are quite complex. Our numerical simulations reveal that if the
complementarity is common, unsophisticated “honest” bidding (bid on the object or the
package that maximize one’s payoﬀ at current prices) leads to CE outcomes in simultaneous
ascending bid auction, with the prices being the minimal equilibrium prices. This gives
us additional grounds to expect that if the bidders behave competitively in the laboratory
setting, the outcomes will converge to the CE predictions for any value of the common
complementarity term.
Examples 1 and 2 (continued) Let k = 50 (moderate complementarity). Then for the
bidder values given in examples 1 and 2 above, the CE outcome is the following. Example
1: pa =6+5 0=5 6 ,pb = 54, thus pa + pb = 6 + 54 + 50 = 110 (the Vickrey price),
with both items allocated to bidder 1. Example 2: pa = 38, pb = 8 + 50 = 58, thus
pa + pb =3 8+8+5 0=9 6(the Vickrey price), with both items allocated to bidder 2. It
is straightforward to check that honest bidding leads to the competitive outcomes for the
cases k =0 ,k = 50 and k = 101, in both examples.
Our ﬁnal theoretical consideration concerns the choice of collusive strategies. BL
strategies support collusive outcomes as equilibria in a one shot auction game. Other
theoretical predictions (Milgrom, 1987) often rely on repeated nature of bidder interactions
to support collusive equilibria in auctions. If bidders interact with each other repeatedly
and vieweach auction as part of an inﬁnitely repeated game, then possibilities for bidder
7collusion are much richer than discussed by BL. In particular, collusion can be sustained
at minimal prices, and bidders may split markets not only within periods, but also across
periods. The latter strategy allows bidders to capture the complementarity term, which
cannot be captured under collusion considered by BL, or under any market splitting within
a period. To summarize:
Observation 2 The following collusive outcomes can be supported as Nash equilibria in
the inﬁnitely repeated auction game, provided that the bidders are patient enough:
1. (Minimal bid) The two items are allocated to two bidders, chosen at random in every
period, at the minimal (seller reservation) prices.
2. (Bid rotation) Bidders take turns across periods in buying both items at the minimal
prices, thus capturing the complementarity term.
For examples 1 and 2 above, these predictions say that the items will be allocated
at minimal prices pa = pb = 1, to either diﬀerent bidders (minimal bid), or to the same
bidder (bid rotation).
In the case of a strong common complementarity (k>100), bidders will prefer the bid
rotation outcome to the BL collusive strategy since it allows them to capture the extra
payoﬀ. However, when there is no complementarity (or k is small), the BL strategy will
yield higher expected payoﬀs for the bidders. The following observations follow easily from
proposition 3 in BL.4
Observation 3 Suppose there are two bidders, n =2 .
• If k =0 , then the expected value to the bidders of the BL strategy is strictly greater
than the expected value from the minimal bid and bid rotation strategies.
• If there is a common complementarity term k>100, then the expected value to the
bidders of the bid rotation strategy is greater than the expected value of the BL and
minimal bid strategies.
Since collusive strategies discussed by BL are rather complex and require bidders to
form consistent beliefs about each others’ behavior, we allow repeated play in our ex-
periments. We are therefore interested in studying whether bidders, if they collude, use
strategies suggested by BL, or, in the case of a positive complementarity, they adopt
payoﬀ-superior collusive strategies that rely on the repeated nature of the auctions. The
4BL,revised draft,April 2000.
8fact that the BL strategy is (ex-ante) superior in the no complementarity case allows us
to examine the motivations of experimental subjects. If bidders are motivated by the re-
peated game setting, then we might expect rotation or minimal bid in all complementarity
conditions. If bidders do not ﬁnd the repeated setting compelling, we might expect the BL
strategy in all cases. On the other hand, if bidders primary motivations are coordination
on Pareto superior equilibria, then we would expect bidders to switch from a BL strategy
with no complementarity to rotation in the presence of a positive complementarity.
3 Experimental design
Groups of subjects participated in a series (up to 25) of computerized ascending auc-
tions for two ﬁctitious objects labeled A and B. The group composition stayed the same
throughout the session. Within an auction period, each object was sold in a separate
auction run simultaneously for both objects. Bidders were free to place, at any time, as
many bids as they desired as long as the bid was at least as great as the reservation price
(equal to one experimental dollar), and the bid was strictly greater than previous bids on
that object. The auction period ended when no new bids had been placed for a number
of seconds.5 Each object was then allocated to the bidder with the highest bid for that
object.
Bidders’ valuations for the objects were integers between 1 and 100. Valuations were
independently drawn from the discrete uniform distribution for each period. In some
sessions bidders faced a complementarity for the two objects: In addition to their randomly
drawn values for each object, bidders earned an “extra payoﬀ” if they were the highest
bidder on both objects. This complementarity term was common to all bidders and
announced at the beginning of the experiment.6
Three treatment variables were considered: market (group) size, complementarity, and
experience. To test the eﬀect of market size on the incidence of collusion, we conducted
experimental auctions with two and ﬁve bidders. Previous experimental evidence, such
as Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990), suggests that groups of size two can more easily
coordinate on Pareto dominant Nash equilibria than can larger groups (who almost always
fail). Thus, a larger group size may lead to less collusion for two reasons: less theoretical
possibilities for collusion, as discussed by BL, and coordination failure, as observed by Van
Huyck et al.
To examine the eﬀect of complementarities, we conducted sessions with either no com-
5The number of seconds that were required to elapse before the end of the auction varied slightly
across experiments due to computer conditions. Thirty seconds was the typical requirement in ﬁve person
experiments and forty seconds was typical in two person experiments.
6See appendix for the experimental instructions.
9plementarity, k = 0, a moderate complementarity, k = 50, or a strong complementarity,
k = 101. BL describe collusive equilibria for both the no complementarity and strong
complementarity case. However, the increased complexity of positive complementarity
environments may lead to less collusion due to subjects’ cognitive abilities. On the other
hand, the repeated auction setting provides comparable possibilities for bidder collusion
in all complementarity treatments.
Finally, we considered previous experience with the auction institution as a treatment
variable. Bidders were either inexperienced indicating that they had not previously par-
ticipated in any of these auctions, or they were experienced indicating that they had
participated in one previous session. In a number of early experimental sessions, we con-
ducted experiments with groups of subjects who had participated in an earlier session
under some treatment (“mixed” experience). In later sessions, experienced subjects were
asked to participate in an identical auction institution in terms of the group size variable
(“sorted” experience).7 Given the sophisticated nature of collusive equilibria, we expected
that experience may be necessary for the subjects to successfully coordinate on these equi-
libria. Table 1 lists the number of experiments completed under each treatment variable
combination.
TABLES 1, 2 AROUND HERE
A total of 40 experimental sessions were completed using students, mostly undergradu-
ates, at the University of Arizona, California Institute of Technology, University of Hawaii,
University of Melbourne, and Pennsylvania State University. Up to ﬁve 2-person markets,
or up to three 5-person markets were run independently in each session. Depending upon
the speed at which the auctions progressed, subjects completed between 6 and 25 auction
periods in a session. For inexperienced subjects, an average of 16.6 and 13.4 periods were
completed in the 2-person and 5-person markets respectively; the experienced sessions
averaged 22.6 and 17.5 periods. A total of 121 separate markets were observed. Table 2
provides a break down of experimental sessions by subject pool.
4 Results
The data from the experimental sessions are summarized in tables 3-5 and ﬁgures 1-5.
Table 3 summarizes experimental sessions by treatment and subject pool, and classiﬁes
experimental outcomes according to criteria to be described below. Tables 4-5 present
descriptive statistics on market prices, eﬃciencies, and bidder gains, pooled by treatment.
7In most late sessions,experienced subjects participated in an identical auction institution in terms of
both group size and complementarity variable.
10Figures 1-5 give examples of market price dynamics by treatment. For expositional con-
venience, the prices we report are the sums of prices for both objects.8 Market eﬃciency,
reported in table 5, is deﬁned in the usual way, as the ratio between the social surplus
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where i is the bidder index, i =1 ,..,n, ai and bi are bidder i’s valuations for objects A
and B respectively, k is the common complementarity term, and xji, j = a,b, are the
allocation coeﬃcients, with xji = 1 if and only if object j is allocated to bidder i, and
xji = 0 otherwise. The maximal social surplus (SSmax) is the allocation which maximizes
the sum of the values across all bidders. Relative bidder gains, also reported in table 5,
are deﬁned as the ratio between the realized and the maximal bidder gains (where the




i=1 paxai + pbxbi)
SSmax
,
where pa and pb are prices at which the objects are sold. Relative gains can be considered
a measure of collusive eﬀectiveness. The greatest proﬁts a collusive group can hope to
obtain is by obtaining the eﬃcient outcome and paying the auctioneer the minimal prices.
TABLES 3-5 AND FIGURES 1-5 AROUND HERE
We compare the actual market characteristics with the following theoretical predic-
tions, discussed in section 2:
• SEA competitive outcome is the only competitive prediction for the 2N and 5N
treatment, but it may also have some predictive power for markets with complemen-
tarities if bidders do not fully take the complementarity term into account.
Notation: “SEA” in the tables, “priceAB” in the ﬁgures.
• “Vickrey” competitive equilibrium outcome is the CE prediction for the posi-
tive complementarity treatments; we use this term to denote the corresponding CE
prediction for both k = 50 and k = 101 cases.9
Notation: “Vick” or “Vprice” in the tables, “Vprice” in the ﬁgures.
8Although each item was sold in a separate market,the market outcomes rarely diﬀered across objects;
for example,in no case the bidders allocated one object to one bidder at a “collusive” price,and the second
object to another bidder at a “competitive” price.
9For the moderate complementarity case, k<100,depending on bidder value draws,competitive
equilibrium outcomes may involve either allocating both objects to the same bidder,in which case the
11• BL collusive equilibrium prediction is only characterized for 2N, 2Y101, and
5N treatments.
Notation: “BL” in the tables, “collsAB” in the ﬁgures.10
• Minimal bid outcome allocates the objects randomly between bidders at the min-
imal price in every period.
Notation: “MinBid” in the tables, “minbid” in the ﬁgures.
• Bid rotation outcome allocates both objects to the same bidder at the minimal
prices. The winning bidder varies across periods.
Notation: “Rotation” in the tables; prices coincide with “minbid” in the ﬁgures.
Based on average prices in each market, we classiﬁed market outcomes into competitive
and collusive categories in the following way:
• For the 2N and 5N (no complementarity) treatments, the markets were classiﬁed as:
– Competitive, if the average market price was no lower that 15% below the
SEA competitive equilibrium prediction;
– Semi-collusive, if the average market price was between 50% and 85% of the
SEA competitive equilibrium prediction;
– Collusive, if the average market price was below 50% of the SEA competitive
equilibrium prediction.
• For the 2Y and 5Y (complementarity) treatments, the markets were classiﬁed as:
– Competitive-SEA, if the average market price was within 15% of the SEA
competitive prediction;
– Competitive-mixed, if the average market price was more than 15% above the
SEA competitive prediction, but more than 15% belowthe Vickrey competitive
prediction;
– Competitive-Vickrey, if the average market price was within 15% of the
Vickrey competitive prediction;
CE price is the “true” Vickrey price,or splitting the objects among bidders,in which case the CE price
is below the “true” Vickrey price (see equations 1,2). For the value draws used in the experiment,with
k = 50,the CE price diﬀered from the Vickrey price in at most 2 out of 25 periods in each market. For
the sake of convenience,we therefore use the term “Vickrey outcome” to denote the CE outcome in all
treatments with complementarities.
10For presentation clarity,the collusive BL prices are displayed in the ﬁgures for the 2N treatment only
(ﬁgure 1). In the 2Y101 treatment,it is obvious from ﬁgure 3 that the BL prediction is out-performed by
one of the alternative predictions for all markets displayed. In the 5N treatment,the collusive BL prices
coincide with the SEA competitive prices in 23 out of 25 periods.
12– Semi-collusive, if the average market price was between 50% and 85% of the
SEA competitive prediction, or if the actual prices were close to the minimal
bid in at least 35% of the periods (see market 3-211 in ﬁgure 2 for example);
– Collusive, if the average market price was below 50% of the SEA competitive
equilibrium prediction.
Classiﬁcation results are given in table 3. These results are robust to variations in thresh-
old price levels used to distinguish between categories. More generally, we will call a
market non-competitive if the average market price is 15% belowthe SEA competitive
prediction, or lower; we will call a market competitive otherwise.
Based on the data in the tables and the ﬁgures, we obtain the following results.
Result 1 (Collusion in small size markets) There was a signiﬁcant amount of col-
lusion in 2N and 2Y50 markets. Thus, collusion does occur in small markets, and the
presence of a common moderate complementarity does not hinder collusion.
Support: Tables 3-5 and ﬁgures 1-2. From table 3, in the 2N treatment with inexperienced
subjects, 9 out of 30 independent 2-person markets (30%) were non-competitive (collusive
or semi-collusive). For experienced subjects, 12 out of 18 markets (55%) were collusive.
From table 4, the prices, on average, were more than 30% below the SEA price in both
2N experienced treatments; bidder gains were 61.39% as compared to 48.7% of the SEA
prediction in 2N experienced (mixed) treatment, and 63.21% as compared to 49.34% for
the SEA prediction in the 2N experienced (sorted) treatment (table 5). Collusion was
observed in 3 out of 4 subject pools (MEL, CIT and PSU) where the 2N treatment was
tested.
In the 2Y50 treatment, out of 16 independent markets with inexperienced subjects, 5
were collusive, and one was semi-collusive; overall, 37.5% of markets were non-competitive.
On average the actual prices were 1.88% less than the SEA prediction. The variance on
this diﬀerence was 58.74 percentage points indicating signiﬁcant heterogeneity in prices
across markets (table 4). Collusion was observed in both subject pools (MEL and CIT)
where the 2Y50 treatment was tested. ✷
We next consider the eﬀects of treatment variables: market size, experience and com-
plementarity, on the incidence of collusion. Table 6 presents the results of logit estimation
of the probability of a market being competitive (i.e., average market price exceeding 85%
of the SEA competitive prediction) as a function of indicator variables for market size
(“large”=0 if N = 2, and “large”=1 if N = 5), subject experience, moderate and large
complementarity, and subject pools.
13TABLE 6 AROUND HERE
Result 2 (Collusion with large numbers) Collusion is a small numbers phenomenon:
no collusion was observed in 5-person markets.
Support: Tables 3-5, 6 and ﬁgures 4-5. All markets in 5N and 5Y treatments are classiﬁed
as competitive (table 3). The mean market price in the 5N treatment is 1.63% percent
above the SEA competitive prediction, with a standard deviation of only 7.5 percentage
points; market eﬃciency is at 98.25% (with a standard deviation of 1.93% only), and
relative bidder gains are at 15.27%, as compared to the SEA prediction of 18.84%. In
5Y50 and 5Y101 treatments, the average market prices, market eﬃciencies and bidder
gains are all in the range between the SEA and Vickrey competitive predictions, and a
distance from any of the collusive predictions (tables 3-5). The results of logit analysis
(table 6) indicate that the market size has a highly positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on market competitiveness. ✷
Result 3 (Eﬀect of experience) Experience in the same size market (“sorted”) in-
creases the incidence of collusion in 2-person markets. Experience in any size market
(“mixed”) does not always increase the incidence of collusion. That is, experience is
market-size speciﬁc.
Support: Tables 3 and 6. In 2N markets at CIT, the percentage of non-competitive
(collusive and semi-collusive) markets increased from 50% among inexperienced subjects
(3 out of 6 markets) to 80% among subjects experienced in the same size market (4
out of 5 markets). In 2N markets at PSU, the percentage of non-competitive markets
increased from 10% (1 out of 10 markets) for inexperienced subjects to 60% (3 out of 5
markets) for subjects experienced in the same size market. In 2Y101 markets at PSU,
the percentage of collusive markets increased from zero among inexperienced subjects (in
9 independent markets) to 28.6% among subjects experienced in the same size market (2
out of 7 markets). Table 6 indicates that experience in the same size market (“sorted”)
has a strong negative eﬀect on market competitiveness, whereas the eﬀect of experience
in any size market is statistically insigniﬁcant. ✷
Result 4 (Collusion with large complementarities) The presence of a large com-
plementarity was detrimental for collusion: there was very little collusion in 2-person
markets with large complementarities.
Support: Tables 3 and 6. Table 6 indicates that the eﬀect of large complementarity,
k = 101, on market competitiveness is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. No collusion
14was observed in any of 17 independent markets in 2Y101 treatment with inexperienced
subjects, at either PSU or UH. With experienced subjects (sorted), only 2 out of 7 markets
were collusive at PSU, and none of 4 markets were collusive at UH. The overall percentage
of collusive markets in the 2Y101 experienced (sorted) treatment was only 18.2%, which
is belowthe percentage of collusive markets in experienced (sorted) markets in either 2N
or 2Y50 treatments. ✷
The data presented in tables 3 and 6 also indicate that there was a signiﬁcant amount
of heterogeneity in collusive tendencies across subject pools; speciﬁcally, MEL and CIT
subjects were more likely to be collusive than PSU and UH subjects. Yet, it is clear from
the statistical analysis (table 6) that the lower incidence of collusion in the 2Y101 markets
as compared to 2N markets cannot be attributed solely to the subject pool eﬀects and is
due to the large complementarity term itself.
The last observation concerns the comparative performance of SEA and Vickrey com-
petitive predictions in markets with complementarities where average prices reached the
competitive levels (85% of the SEA price or above). Table 7 presents the results of an
ordinary least squares regression of the average per market price on the SEA competitive
predictions, Vickrey competitive predictions for markets with complementarities, and a
dummy variable for experienced subjects. (We allowfor diﬀerentiated eﬀects of these
variables in markets without complementarities and markets with moderate and large
complementarities. The variable for market size proved insigniﬁcant and was therefore
excluded from the regression.) The following result suggests that discovering the Vickrey
competitive outcome was not a trivial task for the subjects; in this sense the treatments
with complementarities presented an extra level of diﬃculty for subjects as compared to
the corresponding treatments without complementarities.
TABLE 7 AROUND HERE
Result 5 (SEA and Vickrey competitive predictions with complementaritites)
Among 2Y and 5Y inexperienced markets classiﬁed as competitive, “competitive-mixed”
prediction explains the overall data better than the Vickrey competitive prediction. The
share of competitive markets converging to Vickrey outcomes increased with experience.
Support: Tables 3-5, 7, ﬁgures 2, 3 and 5. The regression results in table 7 indicate that, on
average, the prices in competitive markets with complementarities were half-way between
the SEA and the Vickrey predictions; experience in markets with large complementarities
signiﬁcantly increased the price levels. From table 3, in the 2Y50 treatment, only 2 out
of 10 competitive markets (20%) are classiﬁed as Vickrey-competitive, while the other
158 markets (80%) have average prices between the SEA and Vickrey predictions. In the
2Y101 treatment, 5 out of 17 competitive markets (29.4%) are Vickrey, while the other
12 markets (70.6%) are competitive-mixed. In 2Y101 experienced (sorted) treatment, the
share of Vickrey markets among competitive markets increases to 6 out of 9 (66.7%), while
the other 3 markets (33.3%) are competitive-mixed. In the 5Y101 treatment, the share
of Vickrey markets is 2 out of 5 (40%) for inexperienced subjects, and 3 out of 4 (75%)
for experienced subjects; the other markets were competitive-mixed. See also support for
results 2 regarding prices, eﬃciencies and bidder gains in 5Y treatments. ✷
Given the large amount of 2Y competitive markets where the prices did not reach
the Vickrey level, a natural question is whether these lower prices were due to subjects’
bounded rationality and their inability to fully realize the role of the complementarity term,
or their attempts to suppress price competition in order to achieve higher bidder gains.
From table 5, observe, for example, that in 2Y101 treatment, the SEA outcome yields
average bidder gains of approximately 50%, whereas the Vickrey outcome yields average
gains of only 19% of the maximum. The actual gains for inexperienced subjects were
half-way between the two predictions, at the 34.35% level. Given the above evidence that
markets with large complementarities were rarerly successful in achieving collusive price
levels (result 4), and that deviations from the Vickrey outcome towards the SEA outcome
were observed also in 5Y treatments, where competitive forces were strong, we conclude
that most of the price deviation from the Vickrey prediction should be attributed to bidder
bounded rationality rather than successful eﬀorts to suppress price competition.11
5 Individual behavior and bidder collusive strategies
The pooled data is generally consistent with the BL theory: collusion does occur is small
size markets with multiple objects. The next step is to take a closer look at individual level
data in order to understand the strategies employed by the bidders. Is the BL prediction
similar to the experimental observations? Do other possible strategies such as minimal bid
and rotation do well? By looking at individual behavior, we may be able to identify greater
incidence of attempts to collude; there may be markets where some bidders attempted to
collude but were thwarted by the competitive behavior of other bidders in their market.
For the purposes of this analysis we separate markets into two categories: collu-
sive (average market price is less than 50% of the SEA prediction; 21 markets total), or
non-collusive (all other markets). Such separation allows us to focus on the power of
11From casual observations of bidder behavior during the experiments,we know that some bidders
had diﬃculties realizing that they should bid above their separate item valuations in treatments with
complementarities,both in 5-person and 2-person markets.
16alternative collusive predictions in the markets which have been pre-selected as collusive
on the basis of lowaverage market prices (see table 3).
We begin by looking at the qualitative predictions of models of tacit collusion in multi-
object ascending auctions. Observations of real world auctions and the BL theory predict:
1. Signaling of preferred markets in early bids, and
2. Retaliation in the event of deviation from the collusive strategy.
Both strategies are observed in the data. A bidder is considered to be signaling in a given
period if one of the following conditions is met:
1. They bid on their highest valued object ﬁrst,
2. They bid on both objects at the same time but placed a strictly higher bid on their
highest valued object, or
3. They had the same valuation for both objects.12
While signaling may not be suﬃcient for the development of collusive behavior, it is a
necessary part of the strategies described by BL and a common claim in actual auction
markets.
TABLE 8 AROUND HERE
Result 6 (Signaling in markets with no complementarities) There was a signiﬁ-
cant amount of signaling in 2 and 5-person markets without complementarities. In 2N
markets, more signaling was observed in markets classiﬁed as collusive.
Support: Table 8. The mean proportions of initial bids that can be classiﬁed as signaling
are listed in table 8. Since a bidder who is randomly selecting an initial object to bid on
will appear to be signaling half of the time, we compare the mean signaling proportion
under each treatment to 50%. In the 2N experienced markets and 5N experienced and
inexperienced markets, the level of signaling is signiﬁcantly greater than 50%. In 2N and
5N treatments, 59 out of 151 (39%) subjects placed signaling bids at least 75% of the
time. We also ﬁnd that the level of signaling appears related to collusive outcomes in
the no complementarity treatment; 20 out of 26 (77%) subjects in 2N markets that were
classiﬁed as collusive placed signaling bids at least 75% of the time. A chi-squared test for
diﬀerence in the proportion of signaling in collusive and non-collusive groups is signiﬁcant
12When a bidder has identical valuations across markets,it is impossible to reject the possibility that
the bidder is signaling.
17at any reasonable level of signiﬁcance. In both the 2N inexperienced and 2N experienced
treatments, the mean level of signaling when collusion was observed was signiﬁcantly
greater than under the competitive outcomes.13 ✷
Signaling is only half the story. When collusive agreements are broken, bidders must
be willing to punish deviant bidders by reverting to the SEA strategy. Unfortunately, it is
diﬃcult to distinguish retaliatory moves to the SEA equilibrium from purely competitive
bidding. However, a few clues into the willingness of some bidders to punish defectors is
provided in the data.
Result 7 (Overbidding) Some bidders are willing to bid above their values. The per-
sistence (and growth) of this behavior amongst experienced bidders suggests that bidders
are punishing non-collusive behavior.
Support: In 2N and 5N treatments, 29 out of 154 (19%) bidders placed bids in two or
more periods that were above their valuations for an object. In the complementarity
treatments, 33 out of 156 (21%) bidders placed at least two combined bids that exceeded
their valuations with the added payoﬀ. While some of these bids might be attributed
to mistakes, the amount of overbidding actually increased with experience. In the no
complementarity case, 19 out of 49 (39%) experienced bidders overbid at least twice and,
in the complementarity case, 16 out of 52 (31%) of experienced bidders overbid. A chi-
squared test for diﬀerence in proportion of overbidding in experienced and inexperienced
groups is signiﬁcant at the 10% level for both treatments. ✷
While the BL strategies do not propose bidding at a loss in order to punish non-
collusive bidders, we observe this at times. Previous experimental investigations of as-
cending auctions (without complementarities) found little evidence of overbidding. In a
one shot auction, any such strategy is not rational. The repeated nature of our auction
might rationalize this strategy. It seems to us that the only reasonable explanation for
the persistence of such behavior must be attempts to punish deviant behavior in order to
encourage cooperation in future auction periods. This evidence suggests that at least some
bidders attempt to implement collusive strategies that utilize signaling with the threat to
revert to SEA (or worse) strategies if bidding does not stop at a low level.
While table 8 indicates that there is signiﬁcant signaling in no complementarity treat-
ments, the particularly lowlevels of observed signaling in some of the complementarity
treatments (2Y101 experienced) suggests that a further analysis of the actual strategies
13In the 2N inexperienced case,the diﬀerence of means is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 5% level,and,
in the experienced treatment the diﬀerence between the means is signiﬁcant at any reasonable level of
signiﬁcance.
18utilized is needed. Tables 9-11 examine howw ell various strategies ﬁt the data. We ﬁrst
compare the observed ﬁnal allocations in each period with four possible strategies:
1. Rotation – one bidder is allocated both objects.
2. Split – each bidder is allocated one object (consistent with minimal bid and BL).
3. BL – the bidder predicted by the BL collusive outcome is allocated each object.
4. Eﬃcient – the objects are allocated to the bidders required to obtain the SSmax
(usually consistent with competitive models).
Table 9 reports the proportion of periods that are consistent with each strategy for the 21
markets classiﬁed as collusive; table 10 pools all the experimental data across treatments.
These diﬀerent strategies also predict various prices for the objects. A stricter standard
is to require that the allocation match those predicted by the strategy and that the prices
be “close.” Since bidders often started with bids that were somewhat greater than the
minimal bid or placed bids in increments greater than the minimum required increment (1
experimental dollar), we classiﬁed a price realization as being consistent with a particular
strategy if the sum of the winning bids on the two objects were within 10 experimental
dollars of the prediction. We compare the ﬁve theoretical predictions identiﬁed in section 4
to the observed allocations and prices. The mean proportion of periods consistent with
these strategies are listed in table 11.
TABLE 9 AROUND HERE
TABLE 10 AROUND HERE
TABLE 11 AROUND HERE
It is convenient to consider markets with complementarities ﬁrst.
Result 8 (Bidder behavior in markets with complementarities) Among 2Y mar-
kets classiﬁed as collusive, bid rotation dominates all other descriptions of bidder behavior.
Support: Tables 9-11. In 7 out of 8 2Y50 and 2Y101 experiments classiﬁed as collusive, at
least 70% of the observed allocations have one bidder winning both objects. This is strong
evidence against the BL and minimal bid strategies, which require splitting of the markets
in all periods. However, the Vickrey competitive outcome would also predict winning both
objects in all 2Y101 periods and the vast majority of the 2Y50 periods. When the price
19information is also considered (table 11), none of the data is consistent with the Vickrey
prices. The proportion of the data consistent with rotation also drops when the price
information is added, but rotation remains the strategy that is consistent with the data
the greatest proportion of the time. ✷
It is clear that in 2Y experiments bidders are able to use the repeated nature of the
experimental design in order to select a more proﬁtable strategy. The rotation strategy
enables the bidders to capture the complementarity term that would be lost under any
spitting arrangement such as BL. However, in 2N experiments, bid rotation no longer has
this advantage; the BL strategy yields higher expected payoﬀs.
Result 9 (Bidder behavior in markets with no complementarity) Among 2N mar-
kets classiﬁed as collusive, the allocation of objects is often consistent with the BL strategy.
Support: Tables 9-11. In all 13 2N observations classiﬁed as collusive, bidders are more
likely to split markets; 11 out of 13 observations split the markets 80% or more of the
periods. While this is a strong rejection of bid rotation, minimal bid, BL, and other
collusive strategies are possibly consistent with these allocations. Since any period in which
diﬀerent bidders win is classiﬁed as consistent with the split prediction but BL requires
a particular split of the markets, it is not surprising that more allocations are consistent
with the split classiﬁcation. If bidders were actually utilizing a random minimal bid
strategy, we would expect that half of the time the split classiﬁcation will be consistent
with the BL strategy as well. In 12 out of 13 observations, the proportion of splitting
observations that are consistent with the BL strategy as well is far greater than half. The
introduction of prices drives a wedge between the minimal bid and BL strategies; minimal
bid always predicts the minimum bid level, but BL predicts higher bids in the case of
conﬂict. Not surprisingly, the performance of both strategies decline with the inclusion of
prices. The relative performance of each of the two market splitting strategies does not
change markedly. Pooling across collusive 2N experiments, the null hypothesis that the
mean diﬀerence of observed prices and the BL prices is zero cannot be rejected at a 5%
level; the same hypothesis can be rejected for the mean diﬀerence between observed prices
and minimal bid prices. In all experiments, the average price is considerably higher than
the minimal bid prediction. ✷
The relative strength of the BL strategy in the 2N treatment suggests that bidders,
when they successfully collude, are strategically splitting markets. Given the obviously
higher coincidence of signaling and collusion (Result 6), this result is not that surprising.
We speculate that it is this ability to increase expected proﬁts that enables successful
tacit collusion. If bidders are splitting markets or following a rotation scheme in these
20experiments, the temptation to occasionally deviate from the collusive strategy can be
extremely tempting at times. For example, suppose the bidders have coordinated on a
strategy of bidder 1 always winning market A and 2 always winning market B. Inevitably
there will be valuation draws where 1’s value for A is small but large for B. This would
obviously create a tremendous incentive for 1 to break the collusive arrangement in order
to participate in the auction for B for “just this one period.” However, if he does, the
fragile collusive equilibrium they had reached would be in jeopardy. A BL-type strategy
minimizes this threat since bidders are more likely to be allocated the object they have
a high value on. When combined with result 8 that bidders utilize a rotation strategy in
positive complementarity experiments, these results suggest that bidders will coordinate
on Pareto improving strategies.
6 Conclusions
The analysis of the pooled level data allows us to reach a number of conclusions. In
accordance with recent empirical observations and the BL theory, we found that collusion
occurs in experimental auctions for multiple objects only when the number of bidders is
small. The presence of a common moderate complementarity does not eliminate collusion.
The incidence of collusion increases with bidder experience in small size markets.
A closer examination of the individual data provides insights into the behavior support-
ing the collusive observations. Especially in the no complementarity treatments, signaling
and retaliatory bidding are recognized by bidders as tools to support collusive play. Thus,
outcomes of these auctions, when classiﬁed as collusive, often match the BL model quite
well. However, when there is a positive complementarity, there is the added concern of
“leaving money on the table” in the form of an uncaptured complementarity term. Suc-
cessful collusive bidders appear to avoid this by utilizing a bid rotation strategy (giving
both objects to the same bidder).
These results bear close resemblance to those in the experimental equilibrium selection
literature; small groups of experimental subjects are capable of coordinating on Pareto
superior Nash equilbria. Here we demonstrate that small groups of bidders are able to
coordinate on Pareto improving perfect Bayes Nash equilibria in an environment where
the strategies are signiﬁcantly more complex than those previously examined.
There are a number of results that are inconsistent with theories of collusion in these
auctions. First, the presence of a large complementarity appears to make collusion less
likely. The BL market split is still a PBE with k = 101 and rotation is a more prof-
itable collusive option. What makes a large complementarity substantially diﬀerent than
a moderate one? Is the desire to capture the large common term creating increased
21competitiveness? Second, experienced bidders are willing to bid above their one period
valuations. While such behavior clearly appears related to the attempts to enforce col-
lusive strategies, we are unaware of non-cooperative theory, repeated or otherwise, that
rationalizes this behavior. Are such extreme actions also observed in real auctions?
While the experimental, empirical and theoretical literature on collusion in auctions is
growing, these results suggest two future avenues of research. First, given enough time,
some groups manage to collude while others do not. The information on why some groups
are successful must be contained in the dynamics of the bidding process. Was the collusive
outcomes the results of well planned behavior by a few insightful bidders, or was it the
result of some fortuitous event? Would all groups end up colluding if given enough time?
Second, the simultaneous ascending bid auction is one particular institution for the sale
of multiple objects; other institutions might be more or less susceptible to collusion. For
example, in a ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction, the BL strategy is no longer an equilibrium.
Would collusion be observed experimentally? While Kwasnica (2000) tells us that we
should expect collusion when communication is allowed, we are not aware of any studies
that look for the formation of tacit collusion. Increased experimental and theoretical work
along these lines could provide the potential auctioneer with a thorough understanding of
the opportunities for collusion when implementing diﬀerent auction formats. An under-
standing of howcollusive strategies are manifested in the lab may also allowthe auctioneer




You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of market decision making
in which you will earn money based on the decisions you make. All earnings you make
are yours to keep and will be paid to you IN CASH at the end of the experiment. During
the experiment all units of account will be in experimental dollars. Upon concluding the
experiment the amount of experimental dollars you earn will be converted into dollars at
the conversion rate of 0.015 dollars per experimental dollar. Your earnings plus a lump
sum amount of $5 dollars will be paid to you in private.
Do not communicate with the other participants except according to the speciﬁc rules
of the experiment. If you have a question, feel free to raise your hand. I will come over to
you and answer your question in private.
22In this experiment you are going to participate in a market in which you will be buying
units of ﬁctitious assets. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned to a
market with ONE other participant(s). You will not be told which of the other partici-
pants are in your market. What happens in your market has no eﬀect on the participants
in other markets and vice versa.
From this point forward, you will be referred to by your bidder number. You are bidder
number in this experiment.
Resale Values and Earnings
Trading in your market will occur in a sequence of independent market days or trading
periods. Two assets, A and B, will be for sale in the market in each period. During
each market period, you are free to purchase from the computer a unit of each of the two
assets if you want. The value to you of any decisions you might make will depend on
your “resale values” for the assets which will be assigned to you at the beginning of each
trading period. Resale values may diﬀer among individuals.You are not to reveal your
resale values to anyone. It is your own private information.
If you purchase an asset, your earnings from the asset purchase, which are yours to
keep, are equal to the diﬀerence between your resale value for that asset and the price you
paid for the asset. That is:
YOUR EARNINGS = RESALE VALUE - PURCHASE PRICE.
Suppose for example that you buy asset A and that your resale value is 64 for this asset.
If you pay 30 for the asset then your earnings are
EARNINGS FROM THE ASSET = 64 - 30 = 34 experimental dollars.
You can calculate your earnings on your accounting sheet at the end of each period.
Your total earnings in any period are given by the sum of your earnings for each asset
plus an extra payoﬀ if you buy both assets. In this experiment, the extra payoﬀ of 101
experimental dollars will be received by any bidder whenever that bidder purchases both
assets A and B. Suppose, for example, that you purchased asset A for earnings of 50 and
asset B for earnings of 80. Then your total earnings in that period would be
TOTAL EARNINGS = 50 + 80 + extra payoﬀ.
Remember, if you purchase a unit of a particular asset, you must use the resale value for
that asset. Your earnings from the asset are zero if you do not buy the asset in this period.
Market Organization
23The market is organized as follows. At the beginning of each trading period, you will
be informed about your resale values for the assets, and the minimal (reservation) prices
for which each of the two assets can be sold for. Buyers may then submit bids by entering
bids into the computer. Any bidder is free at any time during the period to place a bid to
buy one unit of either asset at a speciﬁed price. Any bid at least as high as the minimal
price is allowed. Each subsequent bid in the period must be higher than the existing bids
for that asset. For example, if the current highest bid is 31 for asset A, you must bid more
than 31 for asset A. As long as the period is open, you are free to make as many bids as
you like. The period closes when no new bids have been placed for 40 seconds.
After the period is closed, the assets are sold to the bidders with the highest bids for
each asset, provided that these bids are at least as high as the seller’s reservation prices.
No assets will be sold if all bids are below the seller’s reservation prices.
Example 1 Suppose that, in a given period, the seller’s reservation price is 60 for each
asset. If the following bids are entered:
buyer 2 bids 62 on A
buyer 1 bids 61 on B
buyer 1 bids 72 on A
buyer 2 bids 77 on B
Then asset A is sold to buyer 1 for 72 experimental dollars, and asset B is sold to
buyer 2 for 77 experimental dollars.
After the asset allocations and prices are announced, you are required to record your
earnings on your record sheet. There will be a 40 second pause between period to allow
you to record your earnings. This will continue for a number of periods. At the end of
the experiment, you will be asked to calculate your total proﬁts and record them on the
record sheet enclosed.
Submitting Bids and the Bidbook
When the period is open, on your screen you will see a button called, ‘Bidbook’. If
you press that button, a neww indoww ill appear titled, ‘Player Bid Page’. Your bidbook
may look something like this:
Asset Price Minimal Price Quantity Value
A 1 1 52
B 1 1 13
Your resale values for the assets in this period are displayed in the “Value” column.
The “Minimal price” column shows the seller’s minimal (reservation) prices for assets. In
24the hypothetical example above, the seller’s reservation price is 1 for both assets, and
resale values are: 52 for asset A, and 13 for asset B. This indicates that you would receive
a resale value of 52 for asset A if you place the highest bid in that market. Likewise, your
value for asset B would be 13. These numbers may change from period to period.
You may submit a bid by typing a bid price for either asset in the ‘Price’ column, and
then selecting the ‘Submit’ button. Notice that you can place bids for assets A and B
either individually or simultaneously. If you place a bid for both A and B at the same time,
the computer will treat them just as if you had placed them in two separate bids. If your
bid is valid, it will appear in the bottom portion of main (’Asset Market Experiments’)
window. This window displays current bids in the period. Your bids are indicated in blue
while the bids of others are colored black. You may view previous periods’ results by
selecting the ‘Result’ button on your main screen.
Determination of Resale Values
For each buyer the resale value for each asset in each period will be between 1 and
100. For each of the two assets, each number from 1 to 100 has equal chance of appearing.
It is as if each number between 1 and 100 is stamped on a single ball and placed in an
urn. A drawfrom the urn determines the resale value of an asset for an individual. The
ball is replaced and a second drawdetermines the resale value for another participant.
The procedure is then repeated to determine the values of the second asset. The resale
values each period are determined the same way. The following is a table in which the
probability of getting a value in a certain range is listed: (It is for your reference)











Are there any questions?
25Exercise 1 Suppose buyers’ resale values lie between 1 and 100 experimental dollars.
Suppose, in a given period, that the seller’s reservation price for the assets is 30 experi-
mental dollars each. The buyers’ resale values are: 70 experimental dollars (buyer 1 asset
A), 40 experimental dollars (buyer 1 asset B), 45 experimental dollars (buyer 2 asset A),
55 experimental dollars (buyer 2 asset B). Suppose the extra payoﬀ for buying both assets
is 10 experimental dollars for either buyer. The end-of-the period bids are the following:
buyer 2 bids 29 on A
buyer 1 bids 30 on B
buyer 2 bids 42 on B
(1) Which assets are sold?
(2) What did buyer 1 buy? At what price(s)?
What is his (her) proﬁt?
(3) What did buyer 2 buy? At what price(s)?
What is his (her) proﬁt?
Exercise 2 Suppose buyers’ resale values, the seller’s reservation prices, and the extra
payoﬀ are as given in exercise 1, but the end-of-the period bids are the following:
buyer 2 bids 29 on A
buyer 1 bids 30 on B
buyer 2 bids 42 on B
buyer 2 bids 30 on A
(1) Which assets are sold?
(2) What did buyer 1 buy? At what price(s)?
What is his (her) proﬁt?
(3) What did buyer 2 buy? At what price(s)?
What is his (her) proﬁt?
Period zero will be practice. You will receive no earnings for this period. If you have
a question, please raise your hand and I will come by to answer your question.
Are there any questions?
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28No. of Complemen- Notation No. of independent markets
bidders tarity Inexperienced Subjects Experienced Subjects
2 None 2N 30 18
2 50 2Y50 16 6
2 101 2Y101 17 11
5 None 5N 9 2
5 50 5Y50 3 0
5 101 5Y101 5 4
Table 1: Number of experimental markets by treatment
29University Notation No. Sessions No. Markets
Arizona UArizona 4 9
Caltech CIT 5 18
Hawaii UH 6 19
Melbourne MEL 12 39
Penn State PSU 13 36
















2N Mel 2 101, 102 10 6 -- 15 0.04 5 competitive,      
3 semi-collusive,      
2 collusive
2N CIT 1 201 5 20 0.02 3 competitive,       
1 semi-collusive,      
1 collusive
2N PennState 2* 301, 303 10 16 -- 25 0.02 9 competitive,     
1 semi-collusive
2N UH 1 501 5 22 0.02 4 competitive,     
1 semi-collusive
2N exp (mixed) Mel 2 103, 104 6 17 -- 25 0.03 3 competitive,     
3 collusive
2N exp (sorted) CIT 1 204 5 16 -- 25 0.02 1 competitive,     
4 collusive
2N exp (sorted) PSU 1 304 5 25 0.02 2 competitive,     
3 collusive
2N exp (sorted) UH 1 502 2 25 0.02 2 competitive
2Y50 Mel 2 111, 112 10 9 -- 10 0.04 1 compet-SEA,   
4 compet-mixed, 
2 compet-Vick,     
3 collusive
2Y50 CIT 2 211, 212(1) 6 24 -- 25 0.015 3 compet-mixed,    








CIT 1 212(2) 1 25 0.015 1 collusive
2Y101 PennState 3 321, 322, 325 9 17 -- 25 0.015 5 compet-mixed, 
4 compet-Vick




PennState 3 323, 324, 326 7 25 0.015 2 compet-mixed, 




UH 2 523, 524 4 12 -- 25 0.015 1 compet-mixed, 
3 compet-Vick
5N Mel 2 151, 152 4 6 -- 10 0.15* 4 competitive
5N CIT 1 251 1 18 0.15 1 competitive
5N PennState 3 351, 352, 353 4 25 0.15  4 competitive
5N exp (mixed) Mel 1 153 1 15 0.15 1 competitive
5N exp (sorted) PennState 1 354 1 22 0.15 1 competitive
5Y50 Mel 2 161,162 3 7 -- 12 0.15 1 compet-mixed, 
2 compet-Vick




U Arizona 2 473, 474 4 10 -- 21 0.15 1 compet-mixed, 
3 compet-Vick
* one session, exp #302, is excluded due to computer problems
"exp (mixed)" stands for a subject who has earlier been through at least 6 periods under SOME treatment; 
"exp (sorted)" stands for a subject who has earlier been through at least 6 periods in the same size market
Table 3: Summary of experimental sessions
 31actual SEA Vprice BL MinBid
2N markets
30 mean 58.95 64.52 n/a 14.28 2 -7.98 n/a
stddv 16.58 8.44 n/a 2.5 0 24.39 n/a
6 mean 46.61 67.91 n/a 13.57 2 -31.78 n/a
stddv 29.73 5.74 n/a 3.2 0 43.18 n/a
12 mean 39.64 66.15 n/a 13.7 2 -38.12 n/a
stddv 32.63 4.42 n/a 2.14 0 53.28 n/a
2Y50 markets
16 mean 62.72 64.07 120.51 n/a 2 -1.88 -47.48
stddv 41.25 11.17 15.52 n/a 0 58.74 33.47
6 mean 75.51 64.97 124.72 n/a 2 15.74 -39.58
stddv 34.73 5.39 8.61 n/a 0 50.62 27.05
2Y101 markets
17 mean 123.61 66.61 177.06 14.525 2 86.01 -30.17
stddv 36.78 5.87 5.59 2.098 0 53.27 20.41
11 mean 130.71 66 177.06 13.092 2 98.34 -26.35
stddv 68.68 3.63 3.9 2.0616 0 103.88 38.52
5N markets
9 mean 133.48 131.21 n/a 129.43 2 1.63 n/a
stddv 12.49 4.22 n/a 2.59 0 7.5 n/a
2 mean 134.99 131.78 n/a 128.86 2 2.44 n/a
stddv 1.15 0.13 n/a 0.76 0 0.76 n/a
5Y50 markets
3 mean 155.87 129.42 167.28 n/a 2 20.43 -6.83
stddv 9.86 2.31 3.71 n/a 0 6.83 5.21
5Y101 markets
5 mean 170.96 128.05 217.39 n/a 2 33.69 -21.15
stddv 19.99 2.12 5.66 n/a 0 17.19 10.93
4 mean 210.23 133.28 219.73 n/a 2 58.01 -4.27
stddv 25.02 3.87 2.89 n/a 0 20.76 11.79
* One market was sorted; the other 5 markets were mixed.
** One market was sorted, and one was mixed. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of market prices by treatment
Theoretical predictions differ slighly across sessions since they are based on the 
actual bidder values drawn






























 32Treatment No. mkts Actual Vick SEA BL MinBid Rotation Actual Vick SEA BL MinBid Rotation
2N treatment
30 mean  94.63 n/a 100 92.74 74.18 74.18 47.49 n/a 49.71 80.94 73.71 73.71
stddv 4.99 n/a 0 2.04 6.41 6.41 12.29 n/a 5.91 2.72 6.49 6.49
6 mean  97.28 n/a 100 93.08 75.27 75.27 61.39 n/a 48.7 82.3 74.83 74.83
stddv 3.14 n/a 0 1.93 6.54 6.54 22.08 n/a 6.23 2.63 6.64 6.64
12 mean  93.74 n/a 100 92.66 75.04 75.04 63.21 n/a 49.34 81.21 74.61 74.61
stddv 4.48 n/a 0 2.16 4.07 4.07 22.89 n/a 3.45 2.78 4.15 4.15
2Y50 treatment
16 mean  91.17 100 89.26 n/a 54.7 87.21 55.37 25.91 53.05 n/a 54.09 87.05
stddv 4.49 0 1.91 n/a 5.89 4.95 21.63 3.77 5.83 n/a 5.96 5
6 mean  93.31 100 89.14 n/a 54.37 88.53 49.05 25.66 52.4 n/a 53.79 88.4
stddv 3.03 0 0.92 n/a 6.02 4.34 20.1 4.63 3.42 n/a 6.1 4.38
2Y101 treatment
17 mean  89.74 100 79.57 53.68 43.49 90.61 34.35 19.14 50.71 47.14 42.95 90.52
stddv 6.78 0 1.47 2.02 3.44 3.05 14.82 2.07 3.68 2.34 3.47 3.08
11 mean  94.34 100 80.01 53.9 42.71 91.62 35.68 19.87 51.77 48.05 42.17 91.55
stddv 5.34 0 0.92 1.73 2.11 2.32 26.76 2.05 1.52 1.5 2.13 2.35
5N treatment
9 mean  98.25 n/a 100 100 59.99 59.99 15.27 n/a 18.84 20.02 59.47 59.47
stddv 1.93 n/a 0 0 0.46 0.46 5.62 n/a 1.11 1.65 0.47 0.47
2 mean  99.64 n/a 100 100 59.72 59.72 16.78 n/a 19.19 21.16 59.21 59.21
stddv 0.16 n/a 0 0 0.16 0.16 1.78 n/a 0.85 1.24 0.16 0.16
5Y50 treatment
3 mean  96.18 100 85.46 n/a 47.51 73.06 17.9 15.64 20.91 n/a 46.97 72.79
stddv 3.52 0 0.11 n/a 0 0.47 0.65 0.33 0.01 n/a 0.02 0.47
5Y101 treatment
5 mean 87.65 100 73.63 n/a 37.64 78.53 18.77 12.61 22.78 n/a 37.13 78.36
stddv 8.61 0 3.26 n/a 0.24 1.07 4.78 0.93 4.31 n/a 0.24 1.08
4 mean 95.76 100 71.92 n/a 38.43 78.53 13.07 13.42 19.97 n/a 37.93 78.36
stddv 3.48 0 1.72 n/a 0.83 0.54 7.9 0.53 2.83 n/a 0.84 0.54
* Theoretical predictions differ slighly across sessions since they are based on the actual bidder values drawn
Table 5: Efficiency and bidder gains by treatment

























 33Dependent variable: competitive market
Independent Variable Estimated Coeﬃcient Standard Error t-Statistic
one -0.14 0.54 -0.26
large market 2.62∗ 1.14 2.29
experience-mixed 0.73 0.83 0.88
experience-sorted −1.86∗∗ 0.75 -2.48
k = 50 1.04 0.64 1.62
k = 101 1.89∗ 0.94 2.01
CIT 0.19 0.74 0.25
PSU 1.75∗ 0.83 2.12
UH 3.09∗∗ 1.29 2.39
log likelihood -47.845
number of observations 120
percent correctly predicted 80.83
Table 6: Logit estimation of the probability of market being competitive. * – signiﬁcant
at 5% level; ** – signiﬁcant at 2% level.
34Dependent variable: average market price
Independent Estimated Standard t-
Variable Coeﬃcient Error Statistic
one 2.16 8.75 0.25
SEA price, all markets 1.01*** 0.10 10.26
SEA price, markets with k>0 -0.49** 0.20 -2.41
Vprice, markets with k = 50 0.46*** 0.13 3.39
Vprice, markets with k = 101 0.50*** 0.10 5.22
Experience, all markets 4.76 7.09 0.67
Experience, markets with k = 50 -9.36 12.30 -0.76
Experience, markets with k = 101 26.79*** 9.87 2.71
Number of Observations 92
Corrected R-squared 0.83
Table 7: Ordinary least squares regression of average market prices in competitive markets
on the SEA and Vickrey predictions. ** – signiﬁcant at 2% level, *** – signiﬁcant at 1%
level.
35No of
Treatment Individuals Outcome Average
2N 60 all mean 0.51
inexperienced stddv 0.27
54 non-collusive mean 0.49
stddv 0.27
6 collusive mean 0.69*
stddv 0.22
2N 36 all mean 0.63*
experienced stddv 0.29
16 non-collusive mean 0.40
stddv 0.25
20 collusive mean 0.82*
stddv 0.15
2Y50 32 all mean 0.42
inexperienced stddv 0.25
22 non-collusive mean 0.43
stddv 0.24
10 collusive mean 0.41
stddv 0.28
2Y50 12 all mean 0.42
experienced stddv 0.28
10 non-collusive mean 0.36
stddv 0.25
2 collusive mean 0.73
stddv 0.21
2Y101 34 all non-coll mean 0.47
inexperienced stddv 0.30
2Y101 22 all mean 0.27*
experienced stddv 0.23
18 non-collusive mean 0.26*
stddv 0.22
4 collusive mean 0.30
stddv 0.28
5N 45 all non-coll mean 0.68*
inexperienced stddv 0.19
5N 10 all non-coll mean 0.67*
experienced stddv 0.20
5Y50 15 all non-coll mean 0.67*
inexperienced stddv 0.22
5Y101 21 all non-coll mean 0.58
inexperienced stddv 0.21
5Y101 18 all non-coll mean 0.49
experienced stddv 0.31
Table 8: Proportion of initial bids that are consistent with signaling. * – signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent than 0.5 at the 5% level.
36Experiment Market Treatment Periods Rotation Split BL Eﬃcient
102 2 2N inexp 15 0.13 0.87 0.40 0.27
102 5 2N inexp 15 0.33 0.67 0.60 0.27
201 2 2N inexp 20 0.00 1.00 0.90 0.50
103 1 2N exp 25 0.40 0.60 0.56 0.88
103 4 2N exp 25 0.12 0.88 0.80 0.60
104 1 2N exp 25 0.12 0.88 0.84 0.52
304 1 2N exp 25 0.00 1.00 0.68 0.40
304 4 2N exp 25 0.12 0.88 0.68 0.68
304 5 2N exp 25 0.00 1.00 0.84 0.36
204 1 2N exp 25 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.44
204 2 2N exp 25 0.20 0.80 0.72 0.60
204 4 2N exp 25 0.12 0.88 0.80 0.44
204 5 2N exp 25 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.36
112 3 2Y50 inexp 10 0.70 0.30 0.20 0.60
112 4 2Y50 inexp 10 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
112 5 2Y50 inexp 10 0.80 0.20 0.10 0.60
211 1 2Y50 inexp 24 0.83 0.17 0.17 0.54
211 2 2Y50 inexp 25 0.48 0.52 0.32 0.44
212 2 2Y50 exp 25 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.56
323 3 2Y101 exp 25 0.96 0.04 0.04 0.64
326 4 2Y101 exp 25 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.96
Table 9: Collusive Outcomes: Proportion of allocations consistent with various strategies.
37No of
Treatment Markets Outcome Rotation Split BL Eﬃcient
2N 30 all mean 0.47 0.53 0.5 0.7
inexperienced stddv 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.19
27 non-collusive mean 0.5 0.5 0.49 0.8
stddv 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15
3 collusive mean 0.16 0.84 0.63 0.34
stddv 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.13
2N 18 all mean 0.29 0.71 0.63 0.67
experienced stddv 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.23
8 non-collusive mean 0.53 0.47 0.45 0.85
stddv 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.16
10 collusive mean 0.11 0.89 0.78 0.53
stddv 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.17
2Y50 16 all mean 0.79 0.2 0.17 0.6
inexperienced stddv 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.13
11 non-collusive mean 0.8 0.19 0.17 0.63
stddv 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14
5 collusive mean 0.76 0.23 0.15 0.53
stddv 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.06
2Y50 6 all mean 0.81 0.18 0.18 0.63
experienced stddv 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.1
5 non-collusive mean 0.77 0.22 0.22 0.65
stddv 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.1
1 collusive mean 1 0 0 0.56
2Y101 17 all non-coll mean 0.81 0.18 0.16 0.62
inexperienced stddv 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.12
2Y101 11 all mean 0.94 0.05 0.04 0.74
experienced stddv 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.19
9 non-collusive mean 0.93 0.06 0.05 0.73
stddv 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.2
2 collusive mean 0.98 0.02 0.02 0.8
stddv 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.22
Table 10: Mean proportion of allocations consistent with models.
38No of markets
Treatment Markets Outcome Rotation Split BL SEA Vick
2N 30 all mean 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.41 NA
inexperienced stddv 0.09 0.20 0.14 0.24 NA
27 non-collusive mean 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.45 NA
stddv 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.22 NA
3 collusive mean 0.04 0.58 0.42 0.08 NA
stddv 0.08 0.33 0.17 0.04 NA
2N 18 all mean 0.03 0.34 0.24 0.32 NA
experienced stddv 0.08 0.36 0.25 0.31 NA
8 non-collusive mean 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.60 NA
stddv 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.24 NA
10 collusive mean 0.02 0.60 0.42 0.09 NA
stddv 0.04 0.28 0.19 0.09 NA
2Y50 16 all mean 0.23 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.12
inexperienced stddv 0.31 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.17
11 non-collusive mean 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.18
stddv 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.18
5 collusive mean 0.54 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.00
stddv 0.38 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.00
2Y50 6 all mean 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.12
experienced stddv 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.09
5 non-collusive mean 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.14
stddv 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.08
1 collusive mean 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2Y101 17 all non-coll mean 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.18
inexperienced stddv 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.19
2Y101 11 all mean 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.35
experienced stddv 0.35 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.29
9 non-collusive mean 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.43
stddv 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.26
2 collusive mean 0.90 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00
stddv 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.00
Table 11: Mean proportion of allocations and prices consistent with diﬀerent models.
39Figure 1: Examples of market price dynamics in 2N treatment. 









































































40Figure 2: Examples of market price dynamics in 2Y, k=50 treatment. 

















































































41Figure 3: Examples of market price dynamics in 2Y, k=101 treatment. 



















































































 42Figure 4: Examples of market price dynamics in 5N treatment. 















































































 43Figure 5: Examples of market price dynamics in 5Y treatments. 
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